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The emergency operating and response program presented in this chapter is intended to provide operating personnel with guidelines for responding to any kind of emergency. Although emergency action planning must be general enough to apply to a wide variety of situations, it must provide the operator with enough specific information to deal effectively with a particular emergency. Quick response to system failures can avert harmful effects to health and the environment. Every effort should be made to operate and maintain the water reclamation facility (WRF) properly so that its vulnerability to emergency situations is minimized. An excellent reference to obtain is an emergency planning publication entitled Emergency Planning for Municipal Wastewater Treatment Facilities (EPA, 1974).
Thorough preparation is the key to coping successfully with emergencies. Such preparation will include the following measures:
During an emergency, it is extremely important that agencies and individuals who may be concerned or of assistance be contacted early on. A list of names and numbers, such as is shown in Table 80.a.1, should be posted near every telephone in the plant's facilities. The list should be updated regularly.
Updated: April, 1993; March 2000, April 2001
| Westside | (360) 696-0959
| USF Ops Manager | Doug Campbell | (360) 694-2670
| USF Maint. Manager | Tom Burns | (360) 892-8146
| Pager | (360) 418-7859
| Cell | (360) 772-4140
| USF EH&S Mgr. | Dick Vaughn | (360) 735-1322
| USF Project Manager | Paul Proctor | (360) 573-2936
| USF Reg. Tech Mgr. | Kip Edgley | (503) 667-2666
| Cell | (503) 805-8037
| USF West. Reg. EH&S | Matt Maly | (405) 399-5601
| USF Area Mgr. | Owen Boe | (360) 253-4783
| USF Reg. Mgr. | Chibby Alloway, Office | (510) 681-0237
| Home | (510) 254-3832
| Asst. City Engineer | Thomas Boyer, Office | (360) 696-8008
| Home | (360) 573-4791
| Assoc. Civil Engineer | Lilly Longshore | (360) 696-8008
| City Engineer | Victor Ehrlich | (360) 696-8008
| Pub. Util. Emergency | City Ops., Day | (360) 696-8177
| Night | (360) 693-9302
| Sr. Civil Engineer | Don Skaggs | (360) 696-8020
| Civil Engineer | Pat Easley | (360) 696-8223
| Vancouver Fire Department | (360) 696-8166
| Vancouver Police Department | (360) 696-8292
| NW Nat. Gas | (360) 693-2511
| Dept. of Health | (360) 695-9215
| Department of Ecology | Nights/Weekends | (360) 407-6300
| Dave Knight | (360) 407-6277
| SWAPCA | (360) 574-3058
| General Emergency | | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
An effective emergency response plan can ensure continued operation of the WRF under emergency conditions. The plan should provide for the following:
Emergency conditions can result from natural disasters, personnel absence, blocked access, communications loss, faulty maintenance, negligent operation, accidents, and process failures.
The following natural disasters may constitute a threat to the plant:
Lightning. The most serious lightning damage would be from a strike on the treatment plant's motor control centers. A direct strike of these components could put major electrical units at the plant out of service. Remedial action would depend on which components were shut down but would primarily involve immediate repairs of all electrical damage so that normal operation could be resumed as quickly as possible. In the event of such a strike, the operator in charge should not attempt to repair the unit(s) but should immediately contact a trained electrician for the repairs.
Earthquake. Earthquakes can cause damage to both structures and piping. Power outages may result because of earthquakes. Natural gas pipelines may be broken. It is recommended that you review this section with your family so that they are aware of your responsibilities and understand that if you are at work you will be contacting them as soon as possible.
During the earthquake:
After the earthquake:
Freezing Weather. The major problems associated with freezing weather are as follows:
During freezing weather, the operators should take the proper steps to prevent pipelines from freezing and the buildup of ice on equipment. Such measures include cracking open valves and ensuring motor heater operation and the integrity of pipe insulation.
Flooding. Flood-related problems that could have the most immediate detrimental effects on the wastewater treatment process can be divided into two basic categories:
Infiltration is usually present to some degree in any sewer system and increases sharply following a large rainfall. Conversely, inflow is usually seen only during and for a short time after a heavy rainfall. Infiltration, inflow, and the combination thereof are defined as follows:
Leakage through a manhole cover submerged under 1 inch of water can vary from 20 to 70 gallons per minute (gpm), depending on the size and number of openings in the cover. This quantity of water is multiplied by the number of submerged manholes to obtain the total quantity of inflow from this source. Infiltration from groundwater may range from 1,000 to 40,000 or more gallons per day (gpd) per mile of sewer. During heavy rains, when there may be some leakage through the manhole covers in addition to infiltration into the sewers themselves, the rate may exceed 100,000 gpm per mile of sewer. I/I is a variable component of the wastewater flow that depends on the quality of materials and workmanship in the sewers and service connections, the degree of maintenance, and the elevation of groundwater compared to that of the sewers.
Raw wastewater flows increase significantly under flooded conditions. Although the plant's influent pumping station should have adequate capacity to handle peak I/I surges, the increase can cause a severe hydraulic overload of the in-plant process units, such as clarification and sludge return.
Little can be done about a hydraulic overload of this type. The operator will, however, need to make some in-plant adjustments to compensate for the increased load. Aeration rates should be reduced to hold as many solids as possible in the aeration basins and return sludge rates should be increased as necessary to prevent a solids buildup in the clarifiers. Most flood-water infiltration will be low in biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and high in dissolved oxygen (DO) so it will not significantly increase the organic loading to the plant. Storing solids in the aerations basins may deteriorate effluent quality during the hydraulic overload.
If the infiltration and inflow are severe enough to hydraulically overload the clarifiers and if solids are not stored in the aeration basins, there will be a loss of solids from the process. This will deteriorate effluent quality and delay recovery for a considerable period after the hydraulic overload has passed.
The unplanned absence of scheduled employees presents a potential threat to system operations. During emergency situations, blocked access or personal concerns may prevent employees from getting to work. A list of auxiliary personnel should be available to the Project Manager for filling vacancies caused by personnel absence.
When the direct route to treatment facilities is blocked, the effect is the same as personnel absences, but the solution is not as simple. Compensating for blocked access depends on the reason for the blockage. The best preventive measure is to have an available alternative route to the plant that is as far as possible from the existing route.
Communications are often taken for granted in the everyday routine operations, but they become vital during emergency situations. Many of the protective measures and methods of responding to emergencies suggested in this chapter could not be implemented if communications were disrupted.
Without regular maintenance, most equipment will eventually stop working properly. The manner in which equipment is main-tained will generally determine how well and for how long it will perform its intended function. Good maintenance will result in good equipment performance throughout the design period; poor or faulty maintenance will shorten operating life.
Unexpected breakdowns resulting from faulty maintenance can seriously impair the continuing operation of a wastewater treatment facility. Although individual equipment breakdowns can be repaired without causing an emergency condition, the cumulative effects of poor or faulty maintenance can be serious.
For the treatment plant to function satisfactorily, certain procedures must be followed, whether they have been established in-house, by a regulatory agency, or by the local governing body. Deviating from established procedures constitutes negligent operation.
Because negligent operation may not be as readily noticeable as a lack of maintenance, it is potentially more damaging to system operations, in that it could lead to an emergency condition before being discovered. Therefore, sound operating procedures must be developed and maintained to ensure the satisfactory operation of the entire treatment facility.
Persons associated with the operation of a wastewater treatment facility are continuously exposed to potentially hazardous conditions. Accidents can lead to both personal injury and property damage. Even accidents that occur outside the facility premises can affect operations. For example, the accidental spillage of toxic materials into the sewer system could create an emergency condition at the WRF if the spill went undetected for a period of time.
Process failure, as defined by this manual, includes either a partial or total loss of a wastewater treatment facility's process capabilities. In either case, performance can be severely impaired.
Some of the emergency situations discussed in this chapter could lead to partial and, eventually, total process failure if they lasted long enough. Events that could cause complete process failure in a relatively short period of time include flooding, earthquake, lightning, freezing weather, loss of power, sabotage, and toxic spills.
Key individuals will be responsible for organizing available personnel and for preparing a plan of action. Their roles must be clearly identified to ensure that the emergency operating plan will be successfully implemented with a minimum of confusion.
The Project Manager has overall responsibility for the emergency operating plan. The EH&S Manager is responsible for implementing the emergency plan and reports directly to the Project Manager. The following emergency response checklists may be used as guides for treatment system staff emergency responsibilities.
Plant Manager. The Project Manager will:
Safety Officer. The EH&S Manager will:
Operations Manager. The Operations Manager will:
Maintenance Supervisor. The Maintenance Supervisor will:
Facilities and staffing should be established for an emergency response center located in a predetermined, easily accessed location. For Marine Park these are the annex building area and the operator's lab. The senior operator on duty should be responsible for the center; all individuals who perform this function must be adequately trained and thoroughly familiar with the emergency operating and response program.
When emergency condition notices are received by telephone at the administration building, the operator on duty should have a procedure to ensure that all pertinent information about the emergency is accurately recorded. Upon receipt of an alarm, the operator on duty should dispatch the on-call maintenance crew to the scene of the alarm. An updated list of key plant personnel and a current telephone call list, as well as collection system maps and treatment facility piping and wiring diagrams should be maintained at the administration building and should always be available to the operators for use in an emergency.
The City of Vancouver Water Reclamation Facility management is responsible for being familiar with the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-606) and the Office of Emergency Preparedness Circular 4000.5C, Manual for Application, Federal Disaster Assistance Program. If the procedures described in these documents are followed, federal assistance will be received promptly and efficiently.
An emergency equipment inventory should be kept on file and should include all equipment, materials, and chemicals used in the treatment process. The inventory facilitates purchasing and stockpiling of emergency equipment and supplies through mutual aid agreements or outside contracts. The following is a list of emergency equipment that should be available:
If City of Vancouver determines that other items are necessary, these items should be added to this list.
The cost of a preservation program is small compared to the cost of re-establishing records that have been destroyed during emergency events. Maps and records showing the location and condition of underground collection lines are of particular importance in an emergency situation.
There are several methods used to preserve records, including microfilm, but storage is the preferred method for original maps and diagrams of piping. Full-size copies of maps and other detail sheets can be made each year and kept in a flood-proof vault. Copies of layouts of important pumping installations should also be preserved in a safe and accessible area. The following information should be safely stored in easily accessible records:
Maintenance crews and service vehicles must be provided with maps and current records showing the location and condition of collection lines.
The initial step in formulating an emergency response plan is performing a "What If" assessment (an estimate of the effect of an emergency condition) on each portion of the WRF. As listed in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Emergency Planning Publication, the following steps should be followed in making a vulnerability analysis:
Implementing the following measures could substantially reduce system vulnerability:
During or immediately after emergency situations, plant personnel should do the following:
The phone number for Clark County Public Utilities (CCPU) is 699-3000. CCPU is the plant's power supply and should be notified immediately in the event of a power failure.
Increasing concern over the risks of toxic or potentially toxic substances being released to the environment has resulted in the promulgation of laws and regulations at the federal and state levels.
Federal regulations that address the accidental release of hazardous substances are found in the U.S. EPA Final Rules on Reportable Quantity Adjustments under the Superfund Programs (40 CFR Parts 117 and 302, 1986). The Rules list the minimum quantities of identified hazardous substances above which releases to the environment must be reported to the National Response Center (NRC). The toll-free number for reporting to the NRC is (800) 424-8802. A study should be made of the collection system to determine potential sources of hazardous material spills.
An inventory should be made of all industrial contributors to the treatment plant. Each industry should be located on a collection system map and a list of the potential hazardous spill materials present prepared. The names and phone numbers of key personnel with each industry should also be listed. As other industrial contributors are tied into the system, similar records should be kept. These records and information is available through the City's Engineering office.
An early warning system for reporting spills should be established. Rehearsals should be held to plan for actual emergency responses to spills of various materials.
Any number of hazardous materials could be discharged to the wastewater collection system. Industrial wastes introduced into the collection system may contain toxic materials, oil, or other potentially harmful materials. It is also possible for accidental spills to cause the presence of potentially explosive or combustible substances in the collection system and pump station wet wells.
It is the responsibility of the operator to prevent the formation of an explosive mixture. All electrical services in hazardous areas should be explosion-proof rated. Major interceptors and pump stations should be inspected immediately if a spill is suspected. A check should be made for foreign odors, discoloration of the pump station influent, and explosive gases using a combustible-gas detector. Ventilation equipment should be turned on and all doors, windows, and hatch covers opened to allow fresh air to enter the affected area. When monitoring confirms that the concentration of the explosive or combustible gas has been reduced to a safe level, normal operation may be resumed.
If an explosive gas mixture is detected in an area that does not have explosion-proof electrical equipment, DO NOT SHUT THE EQUIPMENT OFF USING LOCAL SWITCHES. Resulting arcing could cause an explosion.
Oil, gasoline, or other hazardous liquids may also enter the system as a result of accidents. For example, a gasoline or oil truck may overturn and, when the Fire Department washes down the street, a quantity of the liquid could enter the collection system at the manholes. When oil or other hazardous floating material is found, the Fire Department should be notified and assistance requested.
Oil, gasoline, or other hazardous floating materials should be removed by skimming at the wet well. The material should be collected and transported to an approved sanitary landfill for ultimate disposal. See Hazardous Substance Spill Prevention and Response Plan Procedures Manual last updated 12/2000 located in the MP library. THE OPERATOR SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO INCINERATE VOLATILE LIQUIDS. If the material cannot be removed by skimming, the operator should immediately notify the Project Manager so emergency action plans can be implemented at the plant to prevent severe disruptions of normal operations.
Personnel should notify the Project Manager if any hazardous material is detected in the wastewater. In addition, the time the material is found and the estimated quantity should be noted. This will assist in determining the source of the material. The discharge of such wastes into the collection system may be in violation of the sewer service regulations. If violations are occurring, a concerted effort should be made to determine the source of the discharge to prevent further occurrences. To minimize the discharge of hazardous materials to the collection system, the following surveillance program is recommended:
Large-scale failure of the equipment used for treatment processes would seriously disrupt operations and even cause the WRF to shut down; consequently, measures must be taken to ensure continued performance. Minor equipment breakdowns should be handled promptly and effectively to prevent further damage, and routine maintenance should be performed regularly on all process units. An up-to-date inventory should be kept of equipment, materials, and chemicals onsite.
The treatment plant can be operated for a relatively short period of a few weeks with less than full staff. The plant can continue to meet the discharge requirements during this period, but it will be difficult for an understaffed crew to keep up on non-critical work such as landscaping, general cleanup, and laboratory tests not completely essential to operation of the plant. Auxiliary personnel should be obtained as quickly as possible during these periods.
If circumstances arise when there is less than full staff assigned to the plant, the operators will have to adjust their work schedules and concentrate on essential duties. The following three essential duties must be accomplished:
If there are no serious equipment failures, a single operator can continue to provide essential preventive maintenance services on equipment. The operator will require additional maintenance personnel in the event of a major, non-redundant mechanical or electrical component failure.
With only two or three operators on duty, they must concentrate on plant operation and will have very little time for maintenance activities other than routine preventive maintenance such as inspection and lubrication.
The emergency plans should be developed using regular organization personnel as much as possible. Alternatives should be provided for all key supervisory jobs. The details of execution must be left to the judgment of the authorized personnel.
During an emergency situation, it may be necessary to bypass a treatment unit. For short periods, it may be necessary to bypass the north train. Each unit process is constructed in multiple units, making it possible to take a unit out of operation for repairs. In fact, the piping throughout the treatment plant is designed to facilitate bypassing of one of the multiple units by closing a valve or gate. While it is possible to partially bypass primary treatment units, it is not possible to bypass the secondary process entirely.
Local police officials should be asked to critique the treatment system's security measures. The Police Department's recommendations on locks, fencing, and lighting should be implemented. Marine Park WRF should ask the Police Department to check on the treatment facility and remote pumping stations routinely. Personnel should alert the police to areas where illegal dumping has occurred. In the event of street spills of explosive or toxic materials, the police should be instructed to notify the operator on duty immediately and provide the following information:
Police officials should be briefed on the role that their department may be asked to play during emergencies within the treatment system. For example, their mobility and communications capability may be valuable in locating the source of hazardous material spills. In sum, the Police Department is responsible for:
Local Fire Department officials visit the treatment facilities at least once a year to recommend ways to minimize fire hazards. They should also check the condition of existing firefighting equipment within all facilities and routinely check fire extinguishers, wiring, and combustible material storage areas. Fire Department officials have been provided with plans of all treatment facility buildings to aid them in preparing responses to potential fires within the system. In short, the Fire Department is responsible for:
Information and recommendations for measures that can minimize emergency problems and promote smooth system operations are discussed below.
Sewer service regulations have been provided by City of Vancouver for protection of the treatment facility and collection system, including regulations on wastewater hookups and the types of wastes that will be accepted by the treatment facility.
A complete set of record drawings is located at the MP administration building. Drawings are not final until all construction is complete and all changes made during construction are recorded.
All plan sets should be bound with a rigid wooden or metal binder and stored by hanging vertically from this binder. Plans should not be stored in a cardboard file folder. These plans and drawings are invaluable in an emergency situation. A duplicate set of drawings should also be kept at the City of Vancouver Engineering building.
Containers of calcium hypochlorite (HTH) should be stored onsite. This material can be used to disinfect small areas of raw sewage and sludge spills. A fiberboard drum is stored in the dumpster area.
In the event of the accidental discharge of raw or partially treated wastewater, the project manager should be notified immediately by phone. The following information should be provided:
A written report covering these points must be submitted to WDOE within 5 working days of the time the operator first became aware of the spill. A Triple I shall also be completed and distributed.
Regular training classes in emergency operations and procedures should be provided for all personnel. Training should include practical on-the-job training as well as formal classroom instruction. All personnel should have a thorough understanding of the entire treatment process and of the elements that can disrupt it or cause it to fail. Simulated emergencies should be conducted periodically for all staff.
Unfortunately, injuries are always a possibility and should be anticipated by training personnel in how to react properly. If someone is injured, the following procedures should be undertaken:
The Project Manager should maintain a file on all employee personal injuries incurred on the job; this file should include severity, type, time, and cause of injuries. This information can be valuable in modifying procedures to prevent injuries at the facility.
Primary first aid training shall be provided every 3 years. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) shall be provided annually. The American Red Cross first aid training course is an excellent introductory course. This course is available locally through the ARC and is frequently offered at local community colleges and high schools as part of an adult continuing education program. Operators should be encouraged to attend these classes by counting hours spent in the classroom as work time. In addition to first aid training, adequate industrial-type first aid kits shall be on hand at all facilities.
First aid should be given to non-breathing accident victims within 4 to 6 minutes to prevent irreversible brain damage. Mouth-to-mouth resuscitation should be administered once every 5 seconds to adults. If the victim is not breathing and has no pulse, CPR should be administered by a properly trained person.
The atmosphere in many areas of the WRF is frequently contaminated by substances that are dangerous to the respiratory system, such as carbon monoxide gas, methane, solvent or paint fumes, hydrogen sulfide gas, and particulates from powdered chemicals and dried sludge. Areas may also be oxygen-deficient.
Personnel should never enter any atmosphere that has not been properly tested; All personnel should receive instruction in the proper use of half mask breathing protection equipment.
In addition to the emergency equipment that has been secured by purchasing and stockpiling or through mutual aid agreements or outside contracts, the list of safety equipment should be readily available to wastewater system personnel. All personnel should have a clear understanding of the use of the equipment, and periodic checks should be made of the equipment and user ability to operate it effectively.
If City of Vancouver determines that other pieces of safety equipment are necessary, they should be added to this list.
80.d Emergency Planning
80.d.1 Personnel Responsibilities
80.d.2 Emergency Response Center
80.d.3 Federal Assistance
80.d.4 Emergency Equipment Inventory
80.d.5 Preservation of Records
80.e Emergency Response Procedures
80.e.1 "What If" Assessment
80.e.2 Methods to Reduce System Vulnerability
80.e.3 Priority Response Checklist
80.e.4 Power Failure
80.e.5 Industrial Spills and Toxic Poisoning
80.e.6 Equipment Failure
80.e.7 Plant Operation When Understaffed
80.e.8 Auxiliary Personnel Requirements
80.e.9 Treatment System Bypass
80.f Coordinating Recommendations For Local Police And Fire Departments
80.f.1 Police Department
80.f.2 Fire Department
80.g General Information For Plant Control
80.g.1 Sewer Service Regulations
80.g.2 Engineering Drawings
80.g.3 Disinfection during Emergencies
80.g.4 Spills
80.g.5 Trained Personnel
80.g.6 Injuries
80.g.7 First Aid
80.g.8 Breathing Apparatus
80.g.9 Emergency Equipment
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